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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article probes whether the pretrial ruling in the British
Petroleum (BP) oil spill multidistrict litigation (MDL), which denied
that the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) displaces pre-OPA substantive
maritime tort law, will prove durable in light of both the ruling's
problematic character and four subsequent Fifth Circuit decisions that
suggest the evolution of OPA jurisprudence will be more amenable to
a pro-displacement outcome.
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A. Framing the OPA/General Maritime Law Displacement Inquiry
OPA was a centerpiece of the MDL and the settlements following
the 2010 blowout of the BP Macondo Outer Continental Shelf well.'
Relying on OPA, the court imposed strict liability for private economic
and property losses resulting from the blowout and the succeeding spill
upon BP, a "responsible party" under the statute.2 This status is
conferred on BP by 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) as the lessee or permittee of
the Outer Continental Shelf tract on which the Macondo well was
located.
The displacement question initially surfaced in the MDL in
response to the economic and property claims of some 110,000
claimants, which were adjudicated in In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
"Deepwater Horizon " (B] Bundle or Ruling) by Judge Carl Barbier.
The MDL's Plaintiffs' Steering Committee (PSC) filed the private
economic and property claims (B] Bundle claims)' under OPA,
maritime law, and state law.' The MDL, which included these claims,
was consolidated with a limitation of liability action (LLA) filed earlier
by Transocean, the owner of the Deepwater Horizon drilling vessel.6
1. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" (B] Bundle), 808 F. Supp.
2d 943, 2011 AMC 2220 (E.D. La. 2011), af'd sub nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d
157, 2014 AMC 2600 (5th Cir. 2014).
2. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012).
3. Section 2702(a) defines the statutory oil discharge tort as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject to the
provisions of this Act, each responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil
is discharged ... into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines ... is
liable for the removal costs and damages specified in subsection (b) of this section
that result from such incident.
Id
4. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon," MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La.
Oct. 19, 2010) (pretrial order no. 11) (creating pleading bundles for various categories of claims
resulting from the BP well blowout).
5. The BJ Bundle Master Complaint included a Master Answer and a Master Claim
in the Transocean limitation action, as well as separate claims under maritime law and OPA
against BP, Halliburton, Cameron, and other parties. See Master Answer to Complaint &
Petition of Triton Asset Leasing GmbH, et al for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liab.
Master Claim in Limitation [No. 10-2771] & Master Complaint, Cross-Claim, & Third-Party
Complaint for Private Econ. Losses in Accordance with PTO No. 11 [CMO No. 1] Section
lI(B1) ["Bl Bundle"] at 136, 155, 157, B] Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 2011 AMC 2220
(MDL No. 2179). The district court established a procedure employing "short form joinders"
allowing the simultaneous assertion of a claim in the limitation action as well as a joinder in
BI Bundle.
6. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon," MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La.
Sept. 21, 2011) (pretrial order no. 41); see also In re Triton Asset Leasing GmbH, No. 4:10-
cv-1721 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2010) (transferring the limitation action to the Eastern District of
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The principal trial plan defendants included BP, the § 2702
"responsible party," and, as general maritime law partial fault
defendants, Transocean, the well driller, vessel owner-operator, and
LLA petitioner; Halliburton, the well cementer; and Cameron, the
manufacturer of the well's blowout preventer.
BJ Bundle's resolution of the displacement controversy
significantly shaped the respective roles of OPA and maritime law in
the subsequent trial. The trial's initial phase globally allocated fault
and liability among the principal defendants and set the stage for
various multibillion-dollar settlements between the defendants and the
B] Bundle claimants, the five Gulf states, and the federal government
both prior to and following the trial.
The MDL afforded a vehicle under which the actions transferred
to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
under 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) were limited to pretrial process only. Unlike
the MDL action, however, the limitation action's transfer under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) authorized trial in light of the consolidation and
transfer of the claims originally filed in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas. The LLA's admiralty concursus
affords a single forum to enjoin all pending suits and to compel them
to be filed solely in the forum so that liability to all claimants may be
determined and, if appropriate, limited.' The forum serves to determine
whether the vessel and its owner may avoid liability altogether on lack
of privity and knowledge grounds and whether the owner may limit its
liability to the value of the vessel.' As occurred in the Transocean-
initiated LLA, moreover, litigants may also assert third-party actions of
various kinds against one another.' Petitioners denied exoneration or
limitation are subject to conventional maritime law tort liability, which
may include both ordinary and, should the petitioner have engaged in
gross negligence or willful misconduct, punitive damages.
The Ruling denied that OPA displaced the pre-OPA substantive
general maritime law claims filed against BP but required instead that
the general maritime law claims also covered by § 2702(b)(2) satisfy
Louisiana). The LLA was brought under the Limitation of Liability Act. See 46 U.S.C.
§§ 30501-30512 (2012).
7. See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARrrTME LAW § 13-6 (6th ed.
2019).
8. See id. § 13-9.
9. See id. §§ 13-1 to -10.
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§ 2713's "presentment" requirement."o Specifically, it stated, "OPA
does not displace general maritime law claims for those Plaintiffs who
would have been able to bring such claims prior to OPA's enactment.""
The claims in question are those that either comport with the
requirement stated by the United States Supreme Court in Robins Dry
Dock & Repair Co. v. Flintl2 that claimants must suffer physical
damage to their own property or qualify under the "commercial
fisherman exception."" The court concluded that "OPA does displace
general maritime law claims against Responsible Parties, but only with
regard to procedure (i.e., OPA's presentment requirement),"l4 such that
general maritime claims may survive as long as they comport with OPA
procedure.
B] Bundle asserts that presentment of a claim in the manner
prescribed by § 2713 is essential to avoid OPA's displacement of
maritime law because "[t]o allow a general maritime claim against the
Responsible Party would serve to frustrate and circumvent the remedial
scheme in OPA."" It premises this outcome on conflicting standards
of liability in OPA and general maritime law, dissimilar limitation
regimes, and the absence of OPA's presentment procedure in maritime
law. B] Bundle ultimately grounds its non-displacement outcome on
two Supreme Court non-OPA opinions: Exxon Shipping Co. v. Bakerl6
and Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend."
Under B] Bundle, pre-OPA maritime actions are separately
pleadable post-OPA, existing alongside OPA's duplicative Robins-
qualified damages action." Section 2702(b)(2)(B) allows a claim to be
10. OPA provides that all claims for damages must be presented first to the responsible
party or its guarantor. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(a)-(b) (2012). Then should the responsible party deny
liability or fail to satisfy the claim within a defined period, the claimant may elect to either
commence an action against the responsible party or its guarantor, or present the claim to an
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund established under § 2712. Id.
11. Bi Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 963, 2011 AMC 2220, 2246 (E.D. La. 2011),
af'dsub nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157, 2014 AMC 2600 (5th Cir. 2014).
12. 275 U.S. 303, 308-10, 1928 AMC 61, 62-63 (1927).
13. Bi Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 958, 2011 AMC at 2239 ("[C]laims of commercial
fishermen are sui generis because of their unique relationship to the seas and fisheries, treating
these fishermen as akin to seamen under general maritime law.").
14. Id. at 969,2011 AMC at 2256.
15. Id at 962, 2011 AMC at 2244.
16. 554 U.S. 471, 2008 AMC 1521 (2008).
17. 557 U.S. 404,2009 AMC 1521 (2009).
18. The term "duplicative" in text speaks to the identity of the tortious injury under
both § 2702(b)(2)(B) and maritime law, namely physical injury to property owned by the
claimant or, viewed from a maritime law perspective, a Robins-qualified claim. For the source
of and implications arising from the identity of the injury-loss or damage to the claimant-
2019] 515
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made for "[d]amages for injury to, or economic losses resulting from
destruction of, real or personal property, which shall be recoverable by
a claimant who owns or leases that property."l9 In contrast, the Ruling
instead focuses on § 2702(b)(2)(E), which enables an action for "pure
economic loss" that cannot be pursued under maritime law because it
is not premised on injury to the claimant's real or personal physical
property.20
The court improperly equated OPA's coverage solely with the
§ 2702(b)(2)(E) "pure economic claims" and maritime law's coverage
solely with Robins-qualified claims, thereby ignoring the gap-filling,
pro-displacement implications of Congress's choice to address both
categories of claims in OPA.2 1 The court's non-displacement language
also signifies that the maritime and § 2702(b)(2)(B) Robins-qualified
claims move on independent tracks, separately available, in all respects
but one: the creation of a hybrid crossover cause of action that
combines substantive maritime law with OPA's § 2713 procedural
presentment format.
B] Bundle summarily encapsulates these outcomes in its assertion
that "[a]s to Responsible Parties, OPA does displace general maritime
law claims against Responsible Parties, but only with regard to
procedure (i.e., OPA's presentment requirement)."22 The court
owned physical property-addressed both in the maritime law Robins-qualified tort and in
§ 2702(b)(2)(B), see Appendix II.
19. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(B) (2012).
20. SeeBl Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 959,2011 AMC at 2240. Section 2702(b)(2)(E)
provides for "[diamages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to
the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources, which
shall be recoverable by any claimant." 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (emphasis added).
21. The vast majority of the B1 Bundle claims failed to meet maritime law's Robins-
qualified status, falling instead under § 2702(b)(2)(E) "pure economic claims" category. At
least seven of the ten damage categories identified by the Deepwater Horizon Claims Center
established under BP's settlement agreement with the PSC and 100,000-plus B1 Bundle
claimants fail under Robins Dry Dock. They include claims classified for Seafood
Compensation, Individual Economic Loss, Individual Periodic Vendor or Festival Vendor
Economic Loss, Business Economic Loss, Start-up Business Economic Loss, Failed Business
Economic Loss, and Real Property Sales Loss. See DEEPWATER HORIZON CLAIMS CTR.,
http://www.deepwaterhorizoneconomicsettlement.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2019). An
evaluation of the claims of some 220,000 claimants processed by the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility, the predecessor to the Deepwater Horizon Claims Center, concluded that "99.8% of
the claims paid and 96.8% of the amounts paid related to claims for lost earnings or profits,"
which amounted to more than $6.2 billion. See BDO CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION
OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY REPORT OF FINDINGS & OBSERVATIONS 59 (2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/06/06/gccf-rpt-find-obs.pdf.
22. 808 F. Supp. 2d at 969, 2011 AMC at 2256; see also Hon. Carl J. Barbier &
Benjamin S. Allums, Selected Issues Encountered in MDL No. 2179, In Re: Oil Spill by the
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achieved this outcome by conceding OPA's displacement of enough
procedural maritime law for this purpose, while holding firm on the
survival of the pre-OPA substantive maritime law claim.
Behind the effort to map B] Bundle's reasoning is the more basic
question of possible litigation consequences attending the outcome of
a displacement dispute. Indeed, this Article puzzles over whether the
structure of OPA and maritime law drive these consequences or
whether the latter drives the former. Useful in assessing the
consequences is the contrast to B] Bundle offered by Gabarick v.
Laurin Maritime (America), Inc.,23 an earlier decision from the Eastern
District of Louisiana that also arose in an LLA concursus in which the
proper choice of law was debated by the limitation petitioner and the
parties claiming injuries from a vessel oil spill. Favoring displacement,
the petitioner argued for the dismissal of all general maritime law
claims seeking damages recoverable under § 2702(b)(2). 24  The
claimants opposed the motion, insisting that OPA "is not preemptive
but supplemental," hence enabling them to "choose to pursue their
claims under General Maritime Law rather than under OPA." 2 5 The
court granted the petitioner's motion to dismiss the general maritime
claims "based on the Preemptive Effect of OPA."2 6 In contrast, B]
Bundle's non-displacement posture facilitated a variety of rulings and
actions central to the court's formulation and management of the trial,
a point Judge Barbier observed post-B1 Bundle in stressing that "[a]
major part of the Court's management of [the MDL] revolved around
trying the Limitation Action to the bench, as it was a proceeding in
admiralty and before the Court for all purposes."27
Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, ADVOCATE, Winter
2012, at 47, 48-49 ("The plaintiffs, relying upon two... Supreme Court cases and [the] clause
[§ 2751(e)] preserving maritime law, contended that OPA did not displace traditional maritime
remedies. The B] Order largely agreed with the plaintiffs. However, claims against a
responsible party still must comply with OPA's 'presentment' procedure ..... (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted)).
23. 623 F. Supp. 2d 741, 2009 AMC 1014 (E.D. La. 2009).
24. Id. at 743,2009 AMC at 1016. In an earlier phase of the action, the court dismissed
without prejudice all claims expressly identified as "OPA claims." Id.
25. Id. at 744, 2009 AMC at 1016.
26. Id at 751, 2009 AMC at 1028.
27. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon," 98 F. Supp. 3d 872, 875, 2015
AMC 1406, 1410 (E.D. La. 2015).
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B. A Roadmap for the Inquiry
In an article written after the Ruling but prior to the foregoing
Fifth Circuit OPA opinions and the MDL/LLA trial, I questioned the
Ruling's non-displacement posture on three principal grounds-two
constitutional and one premised on § 2751 (e).28 The former includes
conflict displacement, given the many discrepancies between the OPA
and maritime law remedial regimes, and primacy displacement, which
pairs the maritime remedial regime with OPA and its remedial regime.
I concluded that OPA both duplicates maritime law's Robins-qualified
cause of action, while extending its coverage and complexity well
beyond and often in opposition to maritime law tenets. I contended
that § 2751(e) does not serve solely as an admiralty savings clause as
suggested in B] Bundle,29 but as a mandatory choice of law clause
requiring OPA governance when OPA provides otherwise3 0 and
maritime governance when it does not. The refinement of these
rationales in this Article sets the stage for consideration of the Fifth
Circuit opinions United States v. American Commercial Lines, L.L.CC, 31
In re Settoon Towing, L.L.C. v. Marquette Transportation Co.,32 In re
Deepwater Horizon,33 and McBride v. Estis Well Service, L.L.C,34
whose interpretive and thematic contrasts with B] Bundle challenge the
Ruling's reliance on an OPA/maritime law hybrid core.
Part II reviews the three rationales to set the stage for a subsequent
discussion of American Commercial Lines, Settoon, and In re
28. John J. Costonis, The BP B1 Bundle Ruling: Federal Statutory Displacement of
General Maritime Law, 38 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1 (2013).
29. See 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 961, 2011 AMC 2220, 2244 (E.D. La. 2011), affd sub
nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157,2014 AMC 2600 (5th Cir. 2014) (reasoning that
Congress did not intend to "occupy the entire field ... as it included [a] savings provision[] ...
that preserved the application of general maritime law").
30. Section 275 1(e) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, this Act does not affect-
(1) admiralty and maritime law; or
(2) the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States with respect to
civil actions under admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases
all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
33 U.S.C. § 2751(e) (2012).
31. 759 F.3d 420,2014 AMC 2400 (5th Cir. 2014).
32. 859 F.3d 340,2017 AMC 1521 (5th Cir. 2017).
33. 745 F.3d 157,2014 AMC 2600 (5th Cir. 2014).
34. 768 F.3d 382,2014 AMC 2409 (5th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
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Deepwater Horizon.3 5 It then examines the Fifth Circuit panels'
exegetical mode as a powerful tool for measuring the Ruling's two-
track model against the plain meaning of key OPA texts. The analysis
highlights the Ruling's avoidance or marginalization of OPA's plain
text, thereby supporting maritime law's displacement in the manner
proposed in this Article.
Part 1 sets forth the pro-displacement thesis enriched by the
MDL/LLA trial and the Fifth Circuit's contributions to the
displacement dialogue. The analysis includes four distinct parts. The
first lists a series of considerations that usefully define the playing field
occupied by the displacement dispute. The second scales the scope of
the displacement effect associated with the different rationales
identified in this Article. The third briefly recounts the nature and root
significance of the two-basket issue although the heavy lifting on this
issue occurs in Part H's review of Settoon and further coverage in
Appendix II. Of final concern is BI Bundle's reliance on the
OPA/maritime law hybrid as an off-ramp for its candid admission that
"[t]o allow a general maritime claim against the Responsible Party
would serve to frustrate and circumvent the remedial scheme in
OPA."36 The proposed hybrid, so essential to overcoming the conflict
displacement problem, is difficult to square with the plain language of
§§ 2702 and 2713 to the contrary.
Part IV scrutinizes the Ruling's deviation from OPA and the plain
meaning of its most significant texts. In particular, this Part evaluates
BI Bundle's extraction of four non-displacement themes from two
Supreme Court opinions, Baker and Townsend, concluding that
reliance on these two opinions to validate the two-track mode
insufficiently grounds its decision.
Overall, this Article asks whether B] Bundle's non-displacement
thesis will or should guide the evolution of OPA jurisprudence on this
central issue. B] Bundle merits praise as a brilliantly engineered
response to a six-state economic and environmental calamity that
creatively redefines how OPA and maritime law interface in a manner
that allows maritime law to survive OPA's enactment essentially intact.
But the jurisprudential trade-off for the court's practical and
35. McBride appears in the Part 1H critique of B1 Bundle's reliance on Townsend to
claim that OPA's adoption after establishment of the maritime negligence tort persuasively
counts against the latter's displacement. See infra notes 145-151 and accompanying text.
36. 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 962,2011 AMC 2220, 2244 (E.D. La. 2011), affdsub nom.
In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157, 2014 AMC 2600 (5th Cir. 2014).
2019] 519
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expeditious claims settlement process 37 arguably entails bending
OPA's prescriptions. This Article posits that the Ruling's non-
displacement outcome may prove to be a one-off exercise explicable,
ultimately, by the exigencies of the event and the court's disinclination
to subordinate admiralty law to OPA." Nor can the two-track model
flourish in a jurisprudence premised on fidelity to OPA as actually
written, as the Fifth Circuit opinions reviewed in Part II demonstrate.
The Article's conclusion enlarges upon both observations.
II. DISPLACEMENT RATIONALES
A. Conflict and Primacy Displacement and the § 2 751(e) Proviso
OPA's displacement of maritime law finds substantial support in
two well-defined constitutional doctrines3 9 favoring congressional over
judicial lawmaking and a third statutory test under the § 2751(e)
proviso, which might more accurately be described as a mandatory
choice of law provision directing OPA's nullification of maritime
provisions when OPA provides otherwise.
1. Conflict Displacement
The court in B] Bundle acknowledged the status of judge-made
maritime law as an obstacle to the achievement of OPA's
congressionally defined goals in its statement that "[t]o allow a general
maritime claim against the Responsible Party would serve to frustrate
and circumvent the remedial scheme in OPA."' The court observed
37. This achievement comports with the Manual for Complex Litigation's prioritization
of expeditious settlements in complex federal litigation. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LmGATION (FOURTH) §§ 11.13, 11.214, 13.11, 22.318 (2004). It is worth noting, however,
that the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, predecessor to the Court Supervised Settlement Program,
processed $6.2 billion in claims for over 220,000 businesses and individuals in the year and a
half period ending December 30, 2011. See BDO CONSULTING, supra note 21, at 56-57. As
of January 29, 2019, 184,383 payments in the amount of $11,747,530,321 have been made to
135,844 unique claimants. See DEEPWATER HORIZON CLAIMS CTR., PUBLIC STATISTICS FOR
THE DEEPWATER HORIZON ECONOMIC AND PROPERTY DAMAGES SETTLEMENT (2019), http://
www.deepwaterhorizoneconomicsettlement.com/docs/statistics.pdf.
38. It also merits attention that the court also exhumed Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), and Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 1996 AMC
2076 (1917), to deny Congress the constitutional authority to enact § 2718, which, BI Bundle
states, "evince[s] Congress' intent to preserve the States' police power to govern pollution
discharges within their territorial waters." See 808 F. Supp. 2d at 954 n.7, 956 n.9, 2011 AMC
at 2232 n.7, 2235 n.9.
39. For a more detailed account of these two constitutional rationales, see Costonis,
supra note 28, at 3-8, 32-46.
40. 808 F. Supp. 2d at 962, 2011 AMC at 2244.
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that the obstacle relates not only to OPA's unique presentment
procedures, but also to OPA's foundation in strict liability rather than
in negligence, and to the divergence between the two systems' liability
limitation regimes including the divergent rules governing the
procedures and the damages provisions of the two limitation regimes.4 1
Discussion of whether the Ruling succeeds in eliminating these
obstacles by requiring claimants to satisfy § 2713's presentment
requirement is deferred to Part Ed.
2. Primacy Displacement
In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, the Supreme Court ruled that
federal statutes displace federal common law when the statutes "speak
directly to [the] question" engaged by common law.4 2 This is known
as primacy displacement. Section 2702(b)(2)(B), which B] Bundle
denied displaced maritime law, precisely duplicates maritime law's
Robins-qualified action. The Supreme Court's formulation prioritizes
Congress's entitlement to displace an issue also addressed in judicially
declared federal common law on the basis that "we are considering
which branch of the Federal Government is the source of federal law,
not whether that law pre-empts state law."' This rationale poses a less
stringent burden than the preemption of state law standard by
substituting displacement's "speaking directly" standard for
preemption's requirement of proof that "Congress ha[s] affirmatively
proscribed the use of federal common law."" It is enough that
Congress has chosen to speak to the same matter that earlier or
subsequently engaged the judiciary's attention. Outright discordance
between the statutory and the common or maritime law competitors is
not required.
4 1. Id.
42. 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S.
618, 625, 1978 AMC 1059, 1065 (1978)).
43. Id. at 319 n.14.
44. Id. at 315. In preemption disputes, City ofMilwaukee adds, courts are to "start with
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Id. at 316 (quoting
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)). Because federalist values are not
implicated in displacement contests, however, "it is for Congress, not federal courts, to
articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law." Id. at 317.
Accordingly, the less stringent displacement requirement that Congress "speak directly to [the]
question" replaces the demanding preemption requirement of Congress's "clear and manifest
purpose." Id. at 315, 317 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp., 436 U.S. at 625, 1978 AMC at 1065).
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3. OPA Proviso Preclusion
Section 275 1(e)'s proviso provides a third rationale barring B]
Bundle's two-track model.45  The proviso functions less as a
displacement mechanism than as a choice of law measure, offering
OPA or maritime law as exclusive alternatives. It cuts both ways,
excluding maritime law when OPA "otherwise provide[s]" and
affirming maritime law when OPA does not.46
The proviso has still another arrow in its quiver, however. As
interpreted in Settoon, considered in the next subpart, the proviso
dictates that the "admiralty claims that are preserved are those that are
not addressed in the OPA,' 7 such as those for personal injuries, death,
or allision and collision. Because OPA's § 2702(b) economic and
property damages section covers both Robins-qualified and pure
economic OPA claims, the Ruling's central contention that pre-OPA
Robins-qualified claims survive OPA's enactment is problematic under
Settoon's distinction between OPA and non-OPA claims.
B. Post-B 1 Bundle Fifth Circuit Jurisprudence
Four Fifth Circuit opinions offer useful guidance on the
displacement question. American Commercial Lines and Settoon are
displacement cases pitting federal statutes against federal common or
maritime law. Although a preemption dispute involving federal versus
state law, In re Deepwater Horizon merits attention because the
displacement cases adopt elements of its reasoning as their own.
Discussion of McBride is deferred to Part IV for consideration of the
45. The district court refers to § 2751(e) along with § 2718, a state savings law
provision, only for the unrelated purpose of demonstrating that OPA does not "occupy the
entire field of oil spill liability." B] Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 961, 2011 AMC at 2244. The
point is not contested here because OPA excludes treatment of various non-oil pollution related
economic injuries such as collision or allision as well as personal injury or death. But this
Article does call for displacement of OPA-identified economic and property remedies in
§ 2702(b), including the pre-OPA maritime remedy for Robins-qualified, oil pollution-sourced
property injury and associated economic loss covered in § 2702(b)(2)(B).
46. BI Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 961-62, 2011 AMC at 2244. This interpretation is
commonplace in various federal district and circuit court actions preceding B] Bundle. See,
e.g., In re Settoon Towing L.L.C., No. 07-1263, 2009 WL 4730971, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 4,
2009); Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Mid-Atl. Corp., 924 F. Supp. 1436, 1447,
1996 AMC 2604,2618 (E.D. Va. 1996), af'dper curiam sub nom. Nat'l Shipping Co. of Saudi
Arabia v. Moran Trade Corp. of Del., Nos. 96-1741, 96-1824, 1997 WL 560047, 1998 AMC
163 (4th Cir. 1997); cf Tanguis v. MV Westchester, 153 F. Supp. 2d 859, 867, 2001 AMC
2652, 2661-62 (E.D. La. 2001) (recognizing that the savings clause of OPA preempts certain
maritime remedies but not others).
47. 859 F.3d 340, 351, 2017 AMC 1521, 1536 (5th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added).
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priority that BJ Bundle, following Townsend, bestows on the timing
rule. An additional Fifth Circuit decision, Veracruz v. BP, PL. C. (In re
Deepwater Horizon), merits listing at this juncture for its declaration
following both B1 Bundle and the MDL/LLA trial's first phase that the
displacement issue remains unresolved within the Fifth Circuit.4 8
Although finding it unnecessary to rule on the issue, the appellate panel
stressed that "we express no opinion on Defendants' argument that the
OPA displaces general maritime law in this or any other case.'"9
American Commercial Lines asked "whether OPA provides the
exclusive source of law for an action involving a responsible party's
liability for removal costs governed by OPA."" American Commercial
Lines (ACL), a responsible party, insisted that both federal common
law and general maritime law applied to reduce its liability in a
subrogation action against it for sums that OPA's Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund (OSLTF) had earlier paid to its cleanup contractors under
relevant provisions." Alleging the contractors' faulty performance, it
sought to join them as third-party defendants or, alternatively, to hold
them directly liable to the extent that it was found liable to the United
States.52 The Fifth Circuit approved the district court's analysis based
on OPA as applied within the Fund's claims process, not the federal
common or maritime law that predated OPA's process,53 thereby
contradicting B] Bundle's apparent restriction of OPA's displacement
of maritime law to § 2713 presentment alone.
Settoon considered whether a "partial-fault" defendant-akin to
the BP MDL's Halliburton or Transocean-bears liability in a
responsible party's contribution action for purely economic damages.54
The Fifth Circuit sustained the responsible party's position by denying
the Robins Dry Dock defense's applicability. It ruled that § 2709
displaces maritime law because the former creates an original OPA
cause of action that overrides the functionally and linguistically
duplicative maritime contribution action, thereby bringing into play
§ 2702(b)(2)(E), which in turn overrides the Robins Dry Dock bar
against "pure economic claims."
48. 784 F.3d 1019, 1022 n.3, 2015 AMC 1347, 1349 n.3 (5th Cir. 2015).
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. 759 F.3d 420,424, 2014 AMC 2400, 2405 (5th Cir. 2014).
51. Id. at 422, 424, 2014 AMC at 2402, 2404; see also 33 U.S.C. § 2712(f) (2012)
(detailing the relevant provisions); 33 C.F.R. § 136.115(a) (2018) (same).
52. Am. Commercial Lines, 759 F.3d at 423-24, 2014 AMC at 2404.
53. Id. at 424, 2014 AMC at 2404-05.
54. 859 F.3d 340, 349-52, 2017 AMC 1521, 1534-38 (5th Cir. 2017).
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In re Deepwater Horizon rebuffed Louisiana's insistence that the
BP blowout's damage to its waters and coastline was actionable under
state law pursuant to maritime law's local police power exception per
the Clean Water Act (CWA) and OPA state law savings clauses." In
barring these claims, the Fifth Circuit panel stressed the dominion over
federal oil pollution governance is shared by a triad of federal statutes:
OPA, CWA, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).5 6
All three appear in the panel's description of OPA's role in the triad as
one of "prescrib[ing] a supplemental, comprehensive federal plan for
handling oil spill responses, allocating responsibility among
participants and prescribing reimbursement for cleanup costs and
injuries," and of serving "as the law of the OCSLA point source .. .
furnishing a comprehensive remedial regime for affected states'
governmental and private claims.""
C. Guidelines for Resolving Displacement Claims
1. The Plain Meaning of OPA's Provisions Must Be Respected
"Statutory construction begins with the language of the statute,"
American Commercial Lines observed, "and, in the absence of
ambiguity, often ends there."" Settoon concurred, having endorsed the
"principle that we should apply the plain meaning of statutory language
while considering its context in the overall enactment."59 The Fifth
Circuit repeated that "[d]uring th[e] interpretive process, 'plain
statutory language is the most instructive and reliable indicator of
Congressional intent."o The court illustrated its concern by
highlighting language from a lower court's opinion that displacement
is evident because "[t]he text of OPA implies its mandatory and
exclusive nature."6 1 Settoon also lauded the value of context, focusing
on Congress's interweaving of OPA provisions, rather than complying
with the third-party defendant's request to "look[] at one [statutory]
section in isolation. "62
55. 745 F.3d 157, 165-69, 2014 AMC 2600, 2607-14 (5th Cir. 2014).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 168, 171, 2014 AMC at 2612, 2617.
58. 759 F.3d at 425, 2014 AMC at 2407.
59. 859 F.3d at 347, 2017 AMC at 1529.
60. Id. at 345, 2017 AMC at 1526 (quoting Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 543
(5th Cir. 2008)).
61. Id. at 345 n.4, 2017 AMC at 1527 n.4 (quoting Gabarick v. Laurin Mar. (Am.) Inc.,
623 F. Supp. 2d 741, 745, 2009 AMC 1014, 1019 (E.D. La. 2009)).
62. Id. at 347, 2017 AMC at 1530.
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These guidelines describe an interpretative path unlike that
pursued in B] Bundle, which derives its two-track rationale largely
outside of OPA and then defends it without grappling with the variety
of OPA statutory issues posed in this Article. Illustrative of this
interpretative mode is B] Bundle's proper characterization of "one [of
OPA's] major remedial purpose[s]" as embracing "a broader class of
claimants to recover for economic losses [under § 2702(b)(2)(C) and
(E)] than allowed under general maritime law."63 Unattended,
however, are both § 2751(e), which Settoon construes as preserving
only the admiralty claims "that are not addressed in the OPA,' and
§ 2702(b)(2)(B), which expressly brings maritime law's Robins-
qualified claims within OPA's coverage.65 The Ruling also
denominates § 2751(e) as an admiralty savings clause6 6 despite the
clause's invalidation of admiralty and maritime norms that require
outcomes that are otherwise than those prescribed elsewhere in OPA.
2. Congressional Primacy Requires Fidelity to Statutory Language
and Context
Disputes involving federal statutes, federal common law, and
maritime law often underscore tension between congressional and
judicial lawmaking roles.6 7 American Commercial Lines and Settoon
faithfully observed the Supreme Court's caution that, "[e]ven in
admiralty. . .where the federal judiciary's lawmaking power may well
be at its strongest, it is [the judiciary's] duty to respect the will of
Congress."' In rejecting the two-track model, American Commercial
Lines warned that "courts cannot, without any textual warrant, expand
the operation of savings clauses to modify the scope of displacement
under OPA."6" It dampened judicial overreach by noting that "it is for
Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to
be applied as a matter of federal law."70
63. 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 959,2011 AMC 2220,2240 (E.D. La. 2011), affdsub nom.
In reDeepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157, 2014 AMC 2600 (5th Cir. 2014).
64. 859 F.3d at 351, 2017 AMC at 1536.
65. See infra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
66. B] Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 957, 2011 AMC at 2237.
67. See Costonis, supra note 28, at 11.
68. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 96 (1981).
69. United States v. Am. Commercial Lines, L.L.C., 759 F.3d 420, 426, 2014 AMC
2400, 2408 (5th Cir. 2014).
70. Id. at 422 n.1, 2014 AMC at 2401 n.1 (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. 304, 317 (1981)).
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Settoon confirmed American Commercial Lines's
acknowledgement through reasoning directly premised on the
congressional primacy rationale. The court harkened to City of
Milwaukee by calling for displacement when pertinent OPA remedial
provisions are functionally duplicative of, rather than hostile to or even
different from, their maritime counterpart.7 1 Notably, the Settoon court
interpreted the term "contribution" as used in both maritime law and in
OPA in accordance with its "general legal meaning" for the purposes
of both § 2709 and maritime law: "[o]ne tortfeasor's right to collect
from joint tortfeasors when, and to the extent that, the tortfeasor has
paid more than his or her proportionate share."7 2 Settoon favored
displacement solely on the basis that the responsible party's
contribution action is a creature of § 2709.73 Only after having done so
did it attend to the ancillary OPA provision, § 2702(b)(2)(E), where
nullification of the Robins Dry Dock bar to pure economic claims is a
function of the opposition between OPA and maritime law concerning
pure economic claims.
The contribution component of Settoon's analysis follows the
Supreme Court's declaration that displacement is more easily proved
than preemption.74 The opinion manifests pro-displacement reasoning
in its declaration that OPA's § 2751(e) "otherwise provide[s]" language
"shows that the admiralty claims that are preserved [by the section] are
those that are not addressed in the OPA."" Congress's will prevails,
therefore, simply in consequence of its choice to include the procedure
or injury within OPA's province.76
71. In re Settoon Towing, L.L.C., 859 F.3d 340, 348-49, 2017 AMC 1521, 1532-33
(5th Cir. 2017).
72. Id. at 347, 2017 AMC at 1530 (quoting Contribution, BLACK'S LAW DIcIONARY
(10th ed. 2014)).
73. Id. Settoon also adverted to the House Conference OPA Report's statement that
"[1iability under this Act is established notwithstanding any other provision or rule of the law."
Id. at 352, 2017 AMC at 1537 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-653, at 103 (1990), as reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 781).
74. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
75. Settoon, 859 F.3d at 351, 2017 AMC at 1536.
76. Pre-B1 Bundle, this position was broadly supported among federal judges who
addressed the OPA/maritime law displacement question. See, e.g., S. Port Marine, L.L.C. v.
Gulf Oil Ltd. P'ship, 234 F.3d 58, 2001 AMC 609 (1st Cir. 2000); Gabarick v. Laurin Mar.
(Am.) Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 741, 2009 AMC 1014 (E.D. La. 2009); Clausen v. M/V New
Carissa, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (D. Or. 2001); Nat'1 Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran
Mid-Atl. Corp., 924 F. Supp. 1436, 1996 AMC 2604 (E.D. Va. 1996), af'd per curiam sub
nom. Nat'1 Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Trade Corp. of Del., 1997 WL 560047,
1998 AMC 163 (4th Cir. 1997).
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Despite attributing the same meaning to the term "contribution"
under both OPA's and maritime law's remedial schemes, Settoon held
that § 2709 "contribution" displaces its maritime counterpart." In
consequence, any other OPA provision pertinent to the Settoon dispute
applied, including § 2702(b)(2)(E), which allowed the Settoon
responsible party to pursue the purely economic damages category off-
limits to maritime law.7 1 The court reasoned that a non-displacement
ruling would have rendered OPA's contribution provision
"superfluous," failed to appreciate the "significance of contribution in
the overall [OPA] remedial scheme," and disregarded Congress's intent
that "OPA itself would largely control liability."" The court advised
that "[t]he short answer [to the non-displacement contention] is that
Congress did not write the statute that way." 0
In re Deepwater Horizon advanced a forceful account of
Congress's intent that OPA dominate the allocation of liability for oil
pollution incidents." Congress intended OPA to build upon the CWA
to "create a single Federal law providing ... liability for oil
pollution,"8 2 to formulate a "supplemental, comprehensive federal plan
for handling oil spill responses,"" and to serve as the "law of the
OCSLA point source ... furnishing a comprehensive remedial regime
for affected states' governmental and private claims."84 Although a
preemption of state law case, In re Deepwater Horizon's celebration of
Congress's commitment to OPA's dominance is echoed in American
Commercial Lines, a case dealing with the displacement of federal
common and maritime law by federal statute." In fact, American
Commercial Lines goes further in proclaiming OPA's remedial
"exclusivity" by analogy to reasoning in the Fifth Circuit's key opinion
favoring the CWA's displacement of the maritime remedy: "[W]hen
77. 859 F.3d at 346,2017 AMC at 1529.
78. Id at 344-45, 2017 AMC at 1525-26.
79. Id. at 348-49, 352, 2017 AMC at 1532, 1537; see also S. REP. No. 101-94, at 24-
25 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 746-47 ("[L]iability and compensation for
petroleum oil pollution damages caused by a discharge from a vessel or facility will be
determined in accordance with this Act.").
80. Settoon, 859 F.3d at 351, 2017 AMC at 1536 (quoting United States v. Naftalin,
441 U.S. 768, 773 (1979)).
81. 745 F.3d 157, 165-68, 2014 AMC 2600,2608-12 (5th Cir. 2014).
82. Id. at 168, 2014 AMC at 2612 (quoting S. REP. No. 101-94, at 9, as reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.CA.N. at 730).
8 3. Id.
84. Id. at 171, 2014 AMC at 2617.
85. 759 F.3d 420,424, 2014 AMC 2400, 2405 (5th Cir. 2014).
5272019]
TULANE LAWREVIEW
Congress enacts a carefully calibrated liability scheme with respect to
specific remedies, 'the structure of the remedies suggests that Congress
intended for th[e] statutory remedies to be exclusive."'8 6
3. Common Law or Maritime Rules that Frustrate OPA's Goals or
Requirements Run Afoul of the Conflict Displacement
Rationale
American Commercial Lines agreed with B] Bundle that maritime
rules that "frustrate" the OPA remedial scheme are superseded on what
essentially are conflict displacement grounds. The American
Commercial Lines court rejected the third-party plaintiffs insistence
on pursuing its breach of contract claim under general maritime law
because doing so would risk "'avoid[ing] the strict liability that OPA
places on responsible parties to pay the cleanup and removal costs,' and
frustrate the statutory scheme and its goal of providing rapid cleanup
and claim resolution."" This reasoning duplicates the conflict
displacement problem that B] Bundle sought to avoid by combining
maritime and OPA substantive and procedural law elements in the
hybrid cause of action."
4. The § 2751(e) Proviso Precludes the Assertion of a Maritime
Tort Claim Spoken to in OPA Under § 2702(b)(2)
American Commercial Lines and Settoon premise the proviso
rationale on the plain meaning of § 2751(e)'s "otherwise provided"
language. Settoon, for example, states that the "admiralty claims that
are preserved are those that are not addressed in the OPA."89 OPA,
86. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. M/V Big Sam, 681 F.2d 432,
441, 1983 AMC 2730,2743 (5th Cir. 1982)); see also Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'1
Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 15 (1981) (ruling that the CWA displaces the federal
common law of nuisance in the ocean pollution sphere because "the absence of strong indicia
of a contrary congressional intent" compels the conclusion "that Congress provided precisely
the remedies it considered appropriate").
87. 759 F.3d at 425, 2014 AMC at 2407 (alteration in original) (quoting United States
v. Am. Commercial Lines, L.L.C., No. 11-2076, 2013 WL 1182963, at *4, 2013 AMC 2087,
2093 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 2013)).
88. See discussion infra Part 111.B. The discussion below of Settoon's and American
Commercial Lines's reliance on the § 2751(e) proviso to bar litigants' invocation of maritime
law rules may alternatively be regarded as bearing on conflict displacement pursuant to
reasoning that treats failure to nullify maritime principles that provide otherwise than rules
prescribed by OPA as frustrating the goal of excluding the former. See infra notes 105-113
and accompanying text.
89. 859 F.3d 340, 351, 2017 AMC 1521, 1536 (5th Cir. 2017).
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therefore, contains its own internal choice of law provision excluding
maritime norms that not only provide otherwise, but that simply
trespass on OPA's province.
The rationale employs several elements to divide pre-OPA
maritime actions that survive OPA from those that do not. OPA does
not cover every injury attributable to or concurrent with an oil
discharge. Pre-OPA status continues post-OPA, for example, for
personal injury, death, or collision injuries as claims that are not
addressed in OPA. Section 2751(e), moreover, cuts both ways: it
overrides maritime actions for injuries addressed by OPA but preserves
those that are not addressed by the statute.
Settoon declared that reading the section as a one-way admiralty
"savings clause" is contrary to its language and plain meaning.90 Such
an interpretation, it stated, "would transform the 'savings clause' into a
supremacy clause by advancing general maritime law over the express
provisions of the OPA" 91 American Commercial Lines warned that
"[t]o interpret § 2751(e) [as permitting a maritime law-based challenge
to OSLTF payments] would be to supersede OPA, and courts cannot,
without any textual warrant, expand the operation of savings clauses to
modify the scope of displacement under OPA."9 2 Section 2751(e)
expresses Congress's intent that the provision override non-
conforming maritime rules, particularly in view of § 2702(a)'s
declaration that OPA's text prevails "[n]otwithstanding any other
provision or rule of law." 93
Section 2751(e) is not self-executing, however, because its
implementation requires the identification and enrollment of the
operative OPA provision that provides otherwise. This task requires
determining whether the "implementing provision" speaks directly to
the matter at hand. Unlike the proviso, the speaking directly standard
does not require that the operative provision self-declare its exclusion
of the maritime norm. For American Commercial Lines, the
implementing OPA provision was § 2712, which affords the "exclusive
source of law" for challenges by responsible parties to OSLTF
payments.94 For Settoon, these provisions included both § 2709, which
creates the OPA contribution action displacing the maritime law
90. Id. at 351, 2017 AMC at 1536-37.
91. Id.
92. 759 F.3d at 426, 2014 AMC at 2408.
93. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012).
94. 759 F.3d at 424, 2014 AMC at 2405.
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counterpart, and § 2702(b)(2)(E), which supersedes the Robins Dry
Dock bar.95
Individually or collectively, the proviso and the speaking directly
requirement contest the premise that OPA's "silence," defined as the
lack of language in an OPA provision expressly declaring itself to
override a specific maritime norm, leaves the latter intact. This premise
runs directly counter to the speaking directly requirement, as American
Commercial Lines held in rejecting ACL's factually correct challenge
that OPA does not "explicitly" displace maritime law.96
Even absent the benefit of the proviso's explicit override, Settoon
and American Commercial Lines leave no doubt that silence might as
easily justify displacement as non-displacement depending upon
careful scrutiny of the statutory context and factual scenario in
question. Under Settoon's primacy rationale, for example, it is
sufficient that OPA speak to the same matter as the maritime principle.
It may do so by precise duplication as in the instance of
§ 2702(b)(2)(B)'s mirroring of the maritime Robins-qualified marine
tort. Or it may do so by responding to the same problem as that arising
on the maritime side. In American Commercial Lines, for example, the
party who unsuccessfully sought breach of contract relief under
maritime contract law found that this route was displaced by OPA
procedures directing it to secure relief before the agency administering
OPA's OSLTF.97
D. Gathering the Loose Ends
1. Elements of a Displacement Claim
Determining whether OPA displaces maritime law requires
identifying both the element(s) of the federal common or maritime law
being displaced and the displacement-inducing OPA provision(s). The
displaced element in American Commercial Lines, for example,
encompassed maritime or federal common law procedures for breach
of contract claims.98 The displacing elements were the OPA statutory
provisions and associated regulations that address OPA subrogation
95. See 859 F.3d at 345, 347, 2017 AMC at 1526, 1529.
96. See 759 F.3d at 424-25, 2014 AMC at 2404-06.
97. Id. at 421-22, 2014 AMC at 2400-01.
98. See id. at 426, 2014 AMC at 2408.
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procedures governing a responsible party's objection to payments to
third parties sourced by the OSLTF.99
In Settoon, the displaced law involved both maritime law contract
breach procedures and the Robins Dry Dock doctrine.'00  The
displacing agents were § 2709, which creates an independent OPA
contribution action, and § 2702(b)(2)(E), which authorizes an OPA
action for purely economic damages.'01 The latter provision came into
play, however, only after § 2709 identified OPA as the correct law
governing this dispute.1 0 2
2. The Three Rationales
A rationale justifying exclusion of the maritime law route,
remedy, or cause of action is imperative to ensure a disciplined and
policy-appropriate displacement decision. Hence, this subpart
discusses three foregoing displacement rationales that, I believe,
undermine B] Bundle's non-displacement posture and their
confirmation and role in subsequent Fifth Circuit decisions.
3. Silence
The proviso and the "speaking directly" requirement clarify that
OPA's silence regarding whether an OPA provision overrides a
maritime norm hardly insures the maritime norm's survival. B]
Bundle, therefore, does not advance its non-displacement position
simply by declaring that "Congress knows how to proscribe punitive
damages when it intends to." 0 3 Yes, the presence of such language will
establish displacement. However, even without such explicit language,
the combined effect of OPA's proviso and the ancillary OPA provision
or language satisfying the "speaking directly" requirement will
establish displacement, as in American Commercial Lines, where the
court rejected ACL's challenge that OPA does not explicitly displace
maritime law."
American Commercial Lines's § 2751(e) analysis reduces the
uncertainties associated with determining congressional intent in the
99. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2712(f), 2713(c)(2) (2012); 33 C.F.R. §§ 136.1-.313 (2018).
100. See 859 F.3d at 348-49, 2017 AMC at 1532-33.
101. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b)(2)(E), 2709.
102. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
103. 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 962, 2011 AMC 2220,2245 (E.D. La. 2011), affdsub nom.
In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157,2014 AMC 2600 (5th Cir. 2014).
104. See 759 F.3d 420,424-25,2014 AMC 2400,2404-06 (5th Cir. 2014).
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face of OPA's silence. The usual metrics of statutory language,
context, comprehensiveness, and legislative history are valuable in
navigating through silence scenarios and may persuasively resolve the
silence problem independently of the American Commercial Lines
analysis. But when applicable, the analysis offers a surer path because
congressional intent to displace is expressly declared in the § 2751(e)
"otherwise provide[s]" language.
4. Displacement's Scope
Factors that anchor displacement in specific scenarios reflect the
variety of scenarios they engage. Settoon, American Commercial
Lines, and, indeed, OPA jurisprudence broadly' confirm that the
illustrative factors catalogued immediately below collectively enhance
the prospects for pro-displacement outcomes.
Protection of OPA's remedial system from frustration or
circumvention is imperative lest the conflict displacement objection
acknowledged by B] Bundle go unchecked. This standard comes into
play whenever a maritime norm threatens to override OPA's text. B]
Bundle, for example, cites maritime law's conflict with OPA's strict
liability, presentment, and limitation of liability requirements.106
Hence, the aptness of Settoon's prescription that "we do not look at
language in isolation, as it is important to examine the statute 'as a
whole and [be] mindful of the linguistic choices made by
Congress."'o7
Settoon also puts teeth into Congress's lawmaking primacy by
displacing the functionally identical maritime contribution with the
§ 2709 contribution simply because Congress chose to bring the latter
within OPA's province.!os This primacy-based factor may impact any
contending OPA provision that brings a matter under OPA's umbrella
because the rationale calls for something close to "automatic
displacement" 09 of the maritime norm by a statutory requirement that
speaks directly to the same issue. OPA's precise duplication in
105. Current OPA jurisprudence, including Part I's Fifth Circuit selections, suggests
that future courts will continue on a multisource, multi-theme course. For an overall
assessment of this jurisprudence preceding BI Bundle, see Costonis, supra note 28, at 13-19.
106. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
107. 859 F.3d at 345, 2017 AMC at 1526 (alteration in original) (quoting Whatley v.
Resolution Tr. Corp., 32 F.3d 905, 909 (5th Cir. 1994)).
108. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
109. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 334 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(coining this phrase in his criticism of the majority's reasoning).
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§ 2702(b)(2)(B) of the maritime Robins-qualified claim exposes the
latter to displacement under this reasoning.
Earlier discussion portrayed §2751(e) as a choice of law
provision that, in conjunction with an operative OPA provision or
provisions, yields the same consequence as a displacement provision;
namely, it vanquishes a pre-OPAmaritime norm.1 o The section's force
also extends to any OPA substantive or procedural provision that
provides otherwise and therefore executes the pro-OPA choice of law
command of § 2751(e)'s executory provision. American Commercial
Lines clarifies that Settoon's description of § 2751(e) as preserving
only those admiralty claims that are not addressed in the OPA does not
require that the implementing OPA provision, like § 2751(e), itself
include language "explicitly" declaring its overriding force."'
B] Bundle confirms that damages for OPA-identified injuries may
also prove a potent displacing factor in consequence of the Ruling's
acknowledgement that "claimants' maritime causes of action against a
Responsible Party are displaced by OPA, such that all claims against a
Responsible Party for damages covered by OPA must comply with
OPA's presentment procedure."1 12 OPA's § 2702(b)(2) damages
inventory neatly traces the boundaries of OPA's coverage while
portraying the sources of OPA-based liability with greater precision
than causes of action or claims, both of which are derivative of the
inventory in any event."
Finally, displacement's scope may be a product of the clustering
of several OPA provisions whose displacing range will vary with their
content. The provisions may do service on behalf of a lead provision,
or, despite their greater autonomy, through combination with one
another. The linkage between the § 2751(e) proviso and the OPA
provision or provisions that implement this executory provision
illustrate the lead provision alternative. The joinder option appears in
the textually linked OPA provisions discussed in the following Part
110. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
112. 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 962, 2011 AMC 2220, 2244-45 (E.D. La. 2011) (emphasis
added), affd sub nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157, 2014 AMC 2600 (5th Cir.
2014).
113. See Gabarick v. Laurin Mar. (Am.) Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 741, 2009 AMC 1014
(E.D. La. 2009). Gabarick approved the responsible party's motion to dismiss maritime claims
deemed by the court to have been displaced by OPA and objected to the claimants' effort to
"cloud the issue at bar by arguing that OPA does not preempt general maritime law claims
rather than focusing on preemption solely of the damages specifically covered by OPA." Id.
at 746, 2009 AMC at 1020.
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between § 2702, defining the OPA offense and damages, and § 2713,
identifying OPA claims as the section's exclusive concern.
III. B] BUNDLE REVISITED
Part II supports the thesis that the maritime law Robins-qualified
maritime tort, the substantive focus of the Ruling's non-displacement
position, did not survive OPA's enactment. It looked to elements
expressed in or as a consequence of the foregoing displacement
rationales, the Fifth Circuit's confirmation of displacement within
subsequent jurisprudence, and problematic reasoning within B] Bundle
itself. Consideration of B] Bundle's search for validation of its non-
displacement's posture in the four principles it derives from the non-
OPA Baker and Townsend decisions is reserved for Part IV.
Three components of the argument in Part II merit additional
attention: the likelihood that the § 2751 proviso rationale may exert
greater influence than the other rationales in the evolution of pro-
displacement OPA jurisprudence, the frailty of the OPA/maritime
hybrid as an exit from maritime law's conflict, and the inroads on the
Ruling's non-displacement claim activated by the "two-basket fallacy."
A. A Favored Role for the Proviso Rationale?
Unlike the conflict and primacy rationales, the § 2751(e) proviso
rationale expressly declares the preclusion of maritime law norms
when OPA otherwise provides, thereby eliminating complications
associated with statutory silence. The proviso gauges congressional
intent on the more objectively determinable compatibility of the
maritime norm with the OPA provision. Given courts' preference for
statutory over constitutional decision-making, moreover, future courts
will appreciate that the proviso affords a statutory exit from the
displacement dilemma, freeing them from the gravity and the uncertain
gauges of the constitutionally based conflict and primacy rationales.
Likewise appealing is the proviso's reliance on § 2702(b)(2)(B)
as an implementing provision that speaks directly and unambiguously
to the same matter as the pre-OPA maritime law Robins-qualified tort:
namely, an action for "injury to, or economic losses resulting from
destruction of, real or personal property, which shall be recoverable by
a claimant who owns or leases that property."ll4 Notable as well are
Settoon's and American CommercialLines's refusal to marginalize the
114. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(B) (2012).
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provision by linking it solely to the preservation of admiralty
jurisdiction and law."'5 For Settoon, the proviso prescribes that the
"admiralty claims that are preserved are those that are not addressed in
the OPA," and a reading of it as a simple savings clause "would
transform [it] into a supremacy clause by advancing general maritime
law over the express provisions of the OPA."" 6 American Commercial
Lines warns that "[t]o interpret § 2751(e) [as permitting a maritime
law-based challenge to OSLTF payments] would be to supersede OPA,
and courts cannot, without any textual warrant, expand the operation of
savings clauses to modify the scope of displacement under OPA."ll 7
B. Mandatory OPA Presentment of Maritime Claims
Saving maritime law by tacking OPA presentment on the
substantive maritime claim contravenes the plain language of the
paired §§ 2702 and 2713. Section 2702(a) addresses "removal costs
and damages.""' Section 2702(b) inventories both these elements
under the heading "Covered Removal Costs and Damages."ll 9 Section
2713(a) provides for presentation of "all claims for removal costs or
damages" either to a responsible party or to an OPA 2714(a)
guarantor.1 2 0  Section 2713(c) offers suitors, whose claims the
responsible party has denied or failed to timely settle, the choice
between commencing an action against the responsible party or the
§ 2714(a) guarantor and presenting the claim to the OSLTF.121
The plain meaning of the two provisions is evident on their face:
OPA reserves presentment exclusively for OPA claims for removal
costs and damages against OPA responsible parties. Any other
outcome is contrary to not only the preceding provisions but also
§ 2702(a)'s uncompromising declaration of OPA's dominance
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision or rule of law."
In fact, OPA would prevail even if it did not displace maritime
law. Commenting on § 2713, Settoon confirmed that § 2713(a) "uses
the absolute words 'all' and 'shall,' directing the course of action for
115. See In re Settoon Towing, L.L.C., 859 F.3d 340, 351, 2017 AMC 1521, 1536 (5th
Cir. 2017); United States v. Am. Commercial Lines, L.L.C., 759 F.3d 420,425-26, 2014 AMC
2400, 2407-08 (5th Cir. 2014).
116. 859 F.3d at 351, 2017 AMC at 1536-37.
117. 759 F.3d at 426,2014 AMC at 2408.
118. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
119. Id § 2702(b).
120. Id § 2713(a).
121. Id. § 2713(c).
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'all claims' and mandating that they 'shall' be presented first to the
responsible party."'2 2 Together, the language of the statute, its
statutorily created terms of art, and its exclusivity immunize § § 2702
and 2713 from service in the manner proposed by the Ruling. The
effort to do so recalls Settoon's rejection of a similar effort to
subordinate § 2709's contribution language to the maritime regime:
"The short answer is that Congress did not write the statute that way."1 23
B] Bundle, moreover, celebrates the clarity and mandatory
character of § 2713's language in its assertion that "[t]he text of the
statute is clear. Congress intended presentment to be a mandatory
condition precedent to filing suit."l 24 However, the text of the statute
is just as clear and mandatory in its restriction of § 2713 presentment
exclusively to OPA claims. Notable as well is the Ruling's silence in
the face of the stiff resistance the pertinent OPA provisions pose to the
court's effort to reformulate the apparent demands of these
provisions.125
B] Bundle's effort to escape conflict displacement is also
underinclusive. By the Ruling's own account, its frustration and
circumvention characterization traces as fully to maritime law's
incompatibility with OPA's strict liability and limitation requirements
as it does to OPA's presentment requirement. In short, all three
requirements are disrupted, which requires that the conflict
displacement solution must attend to all three, rather than only one out
of three.
122. 859 F.3d 340, 345 n.4, 2017 AMC 1521, 1527 n.4 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Gabarick v. Laurin Mar. (Am.) Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 741, 745, 2009 AMC 1014, 1019 (E.D.
La. 2009)).
123. Id. at 351, 2017 AMC at 1536 (quoting United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768,
773 (1979)).
124. 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 964, 2011 AMC 2220, 2248 (E.D. La. 2011), affd sub nom.
In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157, 2014 AMC 2600 (5th Cir. 2014).
125. Perhaps the response is implicit in the court's statement that "[a] judge handling an
MDL often must employ special procedures and case management tools in order to have the
MDL operate in an orderly and efficient manner." Id at 964-65, 2011 AMC at 2249 (citing
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(12); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITGATION (FOURTH), supra note 37,
§ 10.1). However, even in a procedural context, for example, the court views § 2713 as
imposing a "mandatory condition precedent" for claimants filing suit against responsible
parties. Id at 964, 2011 AMC at 2248. The same imperative would seem no less appropriate
for the section's more imposing express restriction of its use exclusively for OPA claims. If
OPA displaces maritime Robins-qualified claims for economic and property damages, refusal
to honor their displaced status as OPA claims would appear to clash with § 2702(b) because it
abridges and modifies a substantive right of parties entitled to assert that right.
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American Commercial Lines, which more carefully attends to
OPA's statutory structure, takes a strikingly different view of the matter
in a passage observing that Congress designed a "carefully calibrated
liability scheme with respect to specific remedies, 'the structure of
[which] suggests that Congress intended for th[e] statutory remedies to
be exclusive."'l2 6 Nor can the statute's many other departures from
maritime lawl27 be ignored if the integrity of OPA's remedial regime is
to be honored-the priority of which drove B] Bundle to combine OPA
and maritime law in the first place.128
C. The "TEvo Baskets " Fallacy
The foregoing difficulties derive in part from an MDL Inaugural
Trial Conference exchange among Judge Barbier, BP's counsel, and
the PSC counsel.129 The participants properly included the Robins-
qualified claims in the maritime basket. However, they effectively
excluded these claims from the OPA basket despite § 2702(b)(2)(B)'s
precise duplication of the Robins-qualified maritime claim. Both sets
of claims are defined as injury to physical property owned by the
claimant.
Recognition that Robins-qualified claims are also OPA claims
triggers an array of questions left unresolved in B] Bundle. Notably,
should Robins-qualified claims compatible with § 2702(b)(2)(B) have
been allowed in the concursus at all?l30 This step renders these claims
126. 759 F.3d 420,424, 2014 AMC 2400,2405 (5th Cir. 2014) (second alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. M/VBig Sam, 681 F.2d 432,441, 1983 AMC 2730, 2743
(5th Cir. 1982)).
127. A partial listing includes § 2702(a), which provides strict liability rather than
negligence; § 2703, which eliminates defenses available under maritime law; § 2704, which
provides for limitation of liability pursuant to protocols other than those pursued under
admiralty limitation protocols; and §§ 2702(d), 2709, and 2715, OPA's prescribed responsible
party contribution and subrogation actions against other spill defendants.
128. Hence, the claims in a post-Ruling PSC action against BP for economic losses
associated with a Gulf of Mexico drilling moratorium were deemed OPA claims on the ground
that the injuries in question were not Robins-qualified. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
"Deepwater Horizon" (OPA Test Cases), 168 F. Supp. 3d 908, 2016 AMC 969 (E.D. La.
2016).
129. See infra Appendix II.A (reviewing the claims baskets' issue in greater detail).
130. The court conceded that OPA claims do not belong in concursus proceedings,
citing In re Methfe Capital Corp., 132 F.3d 818, 821-22, 1998 AMC 635, 639-41 (1st Cir.
1977). See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon," 21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 753, 2014
AMC 2113, 2251 (E.D. La. 2014) ("The Limitation Act does not apply to all claims, however.
Notably, it does not apply to oil spill claims arising under OPA."). This seeming concession
is problematic in view of the inclusion of issues in the LLA/MDL trial directly or indirectly
associated with OPA claims present in the consolidated MDL/concursus actions in several
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vulnerable to displacement by § 2702(b)(2)(B) in light of Settoon's
reasoning that claims included within the OPA basket cannot also be
admiralty claims. As discussed in Parts I and II, there are substantial
reasons for concluding that OPA displaces these maritime claims on
one or more of the three displacement rationales identified.
The previous subpart reasoned that only OPA claims may be
brought under the § 2713 presentment protocol. The hybrid claim does
not qualify because, substantively considered, the Ruling presents a
pure admiralty claim.131 If my objection to the hybrid invention is
valid, maritime claimants are given only two options, neither of which
allows this substantive maritime claim to proceed. Either the claim is
blocked altogether because § 2713 excludes all but OPA claims as OPA
defines these claims, or the claim must be brought as an OPA claim,
which it clearly is under § 2702(b)(2)(B). But this course is also
blocked because OPA claims cannot be brought in a concursus, as the
court itself acknowledges. 132
IV. BAKER AND TOWNSEND: B] BUNDLE'S QUEST FOR VALIDATION
A. The Four Baker/Townsend Propositions
Four propositions extracted by B] Bundle from the Supreme
Court's non-OPA Baker and Townsend opinions afford a framework
for evaluating B] Bundle's non-displacement reasoning.1 33 The Ruling
grounded its non-displacement result principally on two non-OPA
cases that pit, respectively, the CWA against maritime law punitive
damagesl3 and the Jones Act against the maritime maintenance and
cure action.'35 However, neither statute shares OPA's displacement-
favoring structure.
modes, e.g., express OPA claims of plaintiff claimants (BP/PSC settlement opt outs or entities
excluded from the settlement by its own terms); claims by BP in its status as a responsible party
asserting OPA-based contribution claims against non-responsible party defendants; or claims
that, pre-OPA, qualified as general maritime claims, but in this Article's view are displaced by
the OPA. See supra notes 114-132.
131. B1 Bundle's ruling No. 7 includes the statement that "OPA does displace general
maritime law claims against Responsible Parties, but only with regard to procedure, i.e., OPA's
presentment requirement." 808 F. Supp. 2d 943,969,2011 AMC 2220,2256 (E.D. La. 2011),
af'd sub nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157, 2014 AMC 2600 (5th Cir. 2014).
132. See supra note 130.
133. See infra notes 136-146 and accompanying text.
134. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471,2008 AMC 1521 (2008).
135. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404,2009 AMC 1521 (2009).
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1. Conflict Preemption
Earlier discussion endorsed B] Bundle's concession that maritime
law claims against an OPA responsible party may fail on conflict
displacement grounds because, in language rooted in Baker, they
would "frustrate ... the remedial scheme in OPA."l36 The B] Bundle
court paired these claims with OPA presentment to resolve the
problem.137 This Article disagrees with that decision, citing OPA's
displacement of maritime law on several grounds previously detailed,
including § 2713's reservation of its presentment requirement
exclusively for OPA claims and the Ruling's failure to address the other
maritime law differences it identified."' Nor does the Ruling credit the
interface between conflict displacement and § 2751(e); namely, that to
the extent that a maritime norm clashes with § 2713, it also frustrates
an outcome that is faithful to OPA's express text.
2. The Timing Rule: Statutory Displacement of Established
Maritime Principles
In ruling that a maritime maintenance and cure action for punitive
damages survived the Jones Act, Townsend correctly noted that both
the action and the remedy are well established in admiralty law,139 a
factor that B] Bundle stressed weighed heavily in Townsend's
outcome.'40 But not so heavily, the Supreme Court made clear, that the
same result would have been obtained had "Congress ... enacted
legislation departing from this common-law understanding."41
But analogizing OPA to the Jones Act is not easily defended. In
the Supreme Court's assessment of the Jones Act, "[t]he only statute
that could serve as a basis for overturning the common-law rule in this
case,"l4 2 it, like the B] Bundle court, had to determine whether a federal
statute displaced federal common or maritime law. The Court ruled
136. BI Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 962, 2011 AMC at 2244; see Baker, 554 U.S. at
489, 2008 AMC at 1532. The court reasoned that absent § 2713 presentment, the assertion of
general maritime claims against responsible parties violates conflict displacement principles in
light of the differences between OPA and maritime law respecting their respective bases of
liability, limitation regimes, and the absence of OPA's presentment requirement as a feature of
maritime law procedure. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
137. See 808 F. Supp. 2d at 962, 2011 AMC at 2244; discussion supra Part L.B.
138. See discussion supra Part H.B.
139. See 557 U.S. at 409-15, 2009 AMC at 1523-29.
140. See 808 F. Supp. 2d at 960-63, 2011 AMC at 2242-46.




against Jones Act displacement on grounds that undermine B] Bundle's
reliance on Townsend to defend the two-track ruling. The Jones Act
expressly licenses the very two-track model that this Article rules out
for OPA because § 30104(a) of the Jones Act endorses a choice of
actions for seaman and endows them with a right to elect to bring a
Jones Act claim.1 43 "Because the then-accepted remedies for injured
seamen arose from general maritime law," Townsend clarified, "it
necessarily follows that Congress was envisioning the continued
availability of those common-law causes of action.""
In McBride, the Fifth Circuit severely downgraded the Townsend
timing rule as a firm decisional rule.145 Townsend had distinguished
Miles v Apex Marine Corp., in which the Supreme Court held that the
Jones Act precluded more expansive judicially conceived remedies for
wrongful death or unseaworthiness than those in the Jones Act and the
Death on the High Seas Act. 146  Townsend's timing rule favored
maritime law's long-established maintenance and cure and punitive
damages doctrines, but not Miles's action for personal injury and death
on Jones Act and unseaworthiness grounds, the same action pursued by
the McBride plaintiffs.'47
The McBride plaintiffs prevailed in an initial ruling by a Fifth
Circuit panel, which cited Townsend's straightforward rule: a prior
general maritime law cause of action and remedy established before
and not addressed by the Jones Act remains available under that cause
of action unless Congress intercedes.1 48  In an en banc reversal,
however, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged Congress's "paramount
power to fix and determine the maritime law" 49 and held that the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Jones Act in Miles must control
"[e]ven if a general maritime law remedy for wrongful death had been
available to seamen in 1920, when Congress enacted the Jones Act.""
143. Id at416,2009AMCat 1530.
144. Id. The Court added that "[if the Jones Act had been the only remaining remedy
available to injured seamen, there would have been no election to make." Id
145. 731 F.3d 505,518,2013 AMC 2409,2428 (5th Cir. 2013), rev'den banc, 768 F.3d
382, 2014 AMC 2409 (5th Cir. 2014).
146. 498 U.S. 19, 32-33, 1991 AMC 1, 11(1990).
147. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 416, 2009 AMC at 1530; Miles, 498 U.S. at 23, 1991 AMC
at 3; McBride, 768 F.3d at384,2014 AMC at2411.
148. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 414-15, 2009 AMC at 1529; McBride, 731 F.3d at 514,
2013 AMC at 2422.
149. McBride, 768 F.3d at 385, 389, 2014 AMC at 2413, 2418 (quoting S. Pac. Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215, 1996 AMC 2076, 2083 (1917)).
150. Id. at 389, 2014 AMC at 2418.
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Once Congress's lawmaking primacy is conceded, the timing rule
becomes a useful, but hardly conclusive basis for resolving the
displacement question. The overriding question goes to congressional
intent, not to timing. In the BP MDL setting, allowing a maritime
remedy to survive OPA because the maritime tort preceded the statute
is puzzling when, unlike admiralty's maintenance and cure action,
reforming oil pollution law's pervasive deficiencies pre-OPA and post-
Exxon Valdez is uniformly recognized as OPA's raison d'6tre. Tanguis
v. M/V Westchester nailed this point a decade prior to the Macondo spill
in declaring that "[a]lthough traditional maritime remedies for oil spills
pre-date OPA, OPA creates a new, comprehensive federal scheme for
the recovery of oil spill cleanup costs and the compensation of those
injured by such spills.""'
3. OPA's Failure to Occupy the Oil Pollution Remedial Field in its
"Entirety"
In Baker, the Supreme Court rejected Exxon's claim that the CWA
displaced maritime punitive damages because the statute lacks a "clear
indication of congressional intent to occupy the entire field of pollution
remedies."152 B] Bundle followed suit, reasoning that insofar as
§ 2751(e) preserved maritime principles not banished by its proviso,
OPA failed to occupy the entire field.153
The non-displacement conclusion would be unassailable were
field occupation the sole basis upon which displacement could be
predicated. However, the Ruling itself recognizes that conflict
displacement would have defeated maritime law's survival but for the
Ruling's pairing of § 2713 with maritime law claims asserted against
responsible parties.1 54 If §§ 2702 and 2713 bar joinder of the two
tracks,"' conflict displacement remains on the table.' 56 So too do the
considerations associated with the other displacement rationales
detailed in Parts II and III.
151. 153 F. Supp. 859, 867, 2001 AMC 2652, 2661 (E.D. La. 2001). In addition to
American Commercial Lines and Settoon, there are numerous opinions in which OPA has been
held to override maritime law without regard to the prior adoption of the displaced maritime
doctrine. See Costonis, supra note 28, at 13-19 (collecting cases).
152. 554 U.S. 471,489,2008 AMC 1521, 1532 (2008).
153. 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 961, 2011 AMC 2220, 2242 (E.D. La. 2011), affdsub nom.
In reDeepwaterHorizon, 745 F.3d 157, 2014 AMC 2600 (5th Cir. 2014).
154. Id at 964-65, 2008 AMC at 2247-50.
155. See discussion supra Part L.B.
156. See discussion supra Part IB.
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B. Maritime Punitive Damages: Splitting Causes ofAction and
Statutory "Silence"
1. Defining the Issue's Terms
A discussion of splitting causes of action and "silence" requires
clarity in the use of the term damages, which may refer either to the
category of injury envisaged (Damages 1) or the level of damages
(Damages 2), and claims. In the case of an oil spill, for example,
Damages 1 is illustrated by maritime law's pre-OPA Robins-qualified
damages (as applicable to a claimant's physical property) or by
§ 2702(b)(2)'s inventory, which comprehends injuries to natural
resources, one's physical property, subsistence uses, various public
agency revenue losses and public service costs, and pure economic
losses.
Levels of damages targeted by Damages 2 are two-fold:
compensatory and punitive. Although derivative of an underlying
cause of action, punitive damages do not themselves constitute an
independent cause of action.1 7 Baker points out, for example, that its
entitlement to maritime punitive damages claim it addressed in the
Exxon Valdez spill event was premised on Exxon's concession of its
liability pursuant to the underlying marine pollution negligence
action.' Absent the underlying claim, the Supreme Court's allocation
of punitive damages on a one to one ratio of the amount of
compensatory damages awarded for the underlying maritime oil
pollution negligence cause of action would make no sense.
157. Fifth Circuit decisions have predicated access to punitive damages upon an
underlying action where compensatory damages have been awarded, reasoning that "[a] cause
of action for punitive damages is not ... separate and distinct from the underlying claim for
compensatory damages." Lanier v. Sallas, 777 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Sulzer
Carbomedics, Inc. v. Or. Cardio-Devices, Inc., 257 F.3d 449, 461 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Lanier
states quite clearly that only separate and distinct causes of action are appealable and that an
award of punitive damages is not a separate cause of action."). South Port Marine, L.L.C. v.
Gulf Oil Ltd. Partnership applies the same rule in OPA actions stating that "[plunitive
damages, however, do not constitute a separate cause of action, but instead form a remedy
available for some tortious or otherwise unlawful acts." 234 F.3d 58, 64,2001 AMC 609,616
(1st Cir. 2000).
158. 554 U.S. 471, 479,2008 AMC 1521, 1525 (2008) ("For the purposes ofth[is] case,
Exxon stipulated to its negligence in the Valdez disaster and its ensuing liability for
compensatory damages.").
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2. The Underlying Cause of Action Supporting the Punitive
Damages Claim: § 2702, the Maritime Pollution Tort, or
Nothing?
Whichever scheme-OPA or maritime-is chosen as the
underlying cause of action faces difficulties tracing back to the Ruling's
two-track model. The OPA choice is not without its benefits. For
example, OPA allows claims for Robins-unqualified Damages 1, under
§ 2702(b)(2)(E), and at the Damages 2 compensatory level, which the
BP and Exxon Valdez events suggest will overwhelm all other Damages
1 categories in catastrophic blowouts or spills. Choosing OPA avoids
the complications created by the forced union of OPA and general
maritime law had the maritime cause of action been selected instead.
But OPA cannot serve as the underlying cause of action to support
the punitive damages claim because OPA provides only for
compensatory damages even if the responsible party engaged in gross
negligence or willful misconduct.' Seeking maritime punitive
damages on the basis of a § 2702 cause of action, moreover, would
result in a split cause of action in which compensatory damages arise
under OPA and punitive damages under maritime law.
Splitting a cause of action in this manner runs afoul of Baker,
which thrashed Exxon's effort to defend against maritime punitive
damages by conceding that CWA permits ordinary but not punitive
damages for the Valdez oil spill.6 o The Supreme Court explained,
"nothing in the statutory text points to fragmenting the recovery
scheme this way, and we have rejected similar attempts to sever
remedies from their causes of action."' The BP MDL scenario is more
objectionable still because different normative sources-OPA and
maritime law-afford competing underlying causes of action for the
two levels of damages at issue. Baker at least relied on the maritime
negligence tort alone for both.162
The Supreme Court's recourse to Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp.' 3 to support the language quoted above further undermines the
Ruling's reliance on Baker to overcome OPA's displacement of
maritime punitive damages. Silkwood held that the Atomic Energy Act
did not preempt state punitive damages remedies in light of "Congress'
159. See infra notes 176-180 and accompanying text.
160. 554 U.S. at 489, 2008 AMC at 1532.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 514,2008 AMC at 1550.
163. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
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failure to provide any federal remedy for persons injured by [Kerr-
McGee's] conduct."'" "It is difficult to believe," the Court continued,
"that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial
recourse for those injured by illegal conduct." 6 5
Silkwood's reasoning also exposes the asymmetry dividing the
Baker's CWA/maritime and B] Bundle's OPA/maritime law
displacement contests because OPA provides the private tortious action
absent in the Silkwood and Baker federal statutes. In Baker, the CWA's
void remits private claimants to the long-recognized parsimony and
complexity of the pre-OPA maritime cause of action. B] Bundle cites
Justice Stevens's concurrence in Baker as supporting maritime punitive
damages non-displacement.16 6 However, Justice Stevens's reasoning
for doing so undermines B] Bundle's position. Stevens expressed
dissatisfaction with maritime law, citing the Robins Dry Dock doctrine
bar on purely economic losses as one of its principal drawbacks.'
"Under maritime law, then, more than in the land-tort context," he
wrote, "punitive damages may serve to compensate for certain sorts of
intangible injuries not recoverable under the rubric of
compensation."' 61
Dilemmas also pervade selection of the general maritime tort as
the punitive damages' underlying cause of action. Although this choice
avoids claim-splitting, it precludes damages of either level for the
Robins-unqualified claim covered by § 2702(b)(2)(E), if credit is
extended either to the arguments favoring OPA's displacement or to
Settoon's denial of admiralty status for claims, such as the Robins-
qualified tort, that are covered by OPA. It leads as well to foundational
objections arising from use of an OPA/maritime hybrid as an off-ramp
from the Ruling's conflict displacement without the hybrid. These
include the maritime claim's outright displacement under any of three
164. Id. at 251.
165. Id.
166. See 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 962, 2011 AMC 2220, 2246 (E.D. La. 2011), af'dsub
nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157, 2014 AMC 2600 (5th Cir. 2014).
167. Baker, 554 U.S. at 519-20, 2008 AMC at 1555 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
168. Id. Similar reasoning appears in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit's approval of maritime punitive damages in Baker. "The absence of any private right
of action in the [CWA] for damage from oil pollution may more reasonably be construed as
leaving private claims alone than as implicitly destroying them." In re Eron Valdez, 270 F.3d
1215, 1231, 2002 AMC 1, 17 (9th Cir. 2001). Filling these very voids is among OPA's
principal goals, as B] Bundle itself acknowledges. See 808 F. Supp. 2d at 959, 2011 AMC at
2240.
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rationalesl69 and the barrier the plain language of §§ 2702 and 2713(a)-
(c) erect against the joinder of OPA and maritime law elements in the
hybrid.17 0
3. OPA's Silence
Defining "silence" as Congress's failure expressly to declare that
a statute displaces judge-made law is misconceived absent the
identification of a context justifying this position.17 1 Silence, by itself,
declares nothing and proves nothing. Its "message" is a directive to
inquire into the meaning, if any, that the context enveloping the silence
infuses into silence, much as the silence in a musical phrase springs to
life when enriched by the notes that surround it.
The Supreme Court settled this issue in the federal statute and
common law sphere with its City of Milwaukee endorsement of the
speaking directly standard over a demand that "Congress ...
affirmatively proscribed the use of federal common law."1 72 Under the
conflict rationale, the maritime law provision, as stated in B] Bundle,
must frustrate or circumvent the statute's remedial scheme. It is
sufficient under the primacy rationale that the statute speak directly to
the matter addressed by the maritime principle. American Commercial
Lines demonstrates this standard by describing the gulf between
vindication procedures for breach of contract claims under OPA and
under maritime law.173  Settoon, on the other hand, confirmed the
duplication under both systems. 17 The different characterizations
parallel American Commercial Lines's reliance on conflict
displacement and Settoon's reliance on primacy displacement.
169. See discussion supra Part II.A.
170. See discussion supra Part E.B. Settoon's position that maritime law rules or
concepts that are duplicated in OPA are displaced under the primacy rationale would seem
tailor-made for the duplication of the maritime Robins-qualified cause of action in
§ 2702(b)(2)(B). See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
171. The Ruling suggests this interpretation in its assertion that "Congress knows how
to proscribe punitive damages when it intends to," and its otherwise non-precise use of the term
silence in key parts of its punitive damages discussion. See BI Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 962,
2011 AMC at 2245. Neither City ofMilwaukee nor Mobil Oil Corp. require that the resolution
of every element of the problem constituting the matter spoken about be resolved in an identical
fashion to that of the common law or maritime scheme. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. 304 (1981); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618,625, 1978 AMC 1059, 1065
(1978).
172. 451 U.S. at 315.
173. 759 F.3d 420,424-26,2014 AMC 2400,2404-08 (5th Cir. 2014).
174. See 859 F.3d 340, 348-49, 2017 AMC 1521, 1532-33 (5th Cir. 2017).
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Within the B] Bundle framework, both OPA and maritime law
speak directly to the design of a remedial scheme for private economic
and property losses resulting from marine oil discharges. More
precisely, their joint concern focuses on a category of injury covering
property owned or leased to the claimant, which is a matter as precisely
defined in § 2702(b)(2)(B) as in maritime law's Robins-qualified tort.
Hence, devising a legal response to this injury is the matter to which
the federal statute must "speak directly" and in fact does in both
American Commercial Lines and Settoon.
While the statute must speak directly to the same matter, it need
not give the same answer as the common law counterpart. Like
American Commercial Lines, B] Bundle demonstrates that when the
maritime response frustrates and circumvents the statutory response,
the conflict rationale requires displacement.17 5 But such conflict is not
required under the primacy rationale under which displacement may
occur, as Settoon demonstrates, even when OPA and the maritime rules
address the same matter.
OPA's § 2751(e) proviso, moreover, concretely challenges
maritime punitive damages application to OPA-covered marine oil spill
actions. Unlike the constitutional speaking directly standard, the
proviso expressly calls for preclusion of admiralty and general
maritime law when OPA "otherwise provide[s]." This executory
provision requires the assistance of an implementing provision
establishing that the "otherwise provide[s]" condition is satisfied.
Despite the Ruling's view that OPA and maritime law limitation
schemes complement one another,'7 6 §§ 2701(3)-(5), 2704(a), and
2704(c)(1)(A) suggest otherwise. Section 2701(3)-(5) specifies that
the sole Damages 2 level recognized in OPA is compensatory
damages."' Section 2704(a) and (c)(1)(A), when read against this
default compensatory damages rule, provides that the measure of a
responsible party's recovery for gross negligence or willful misconduct
175. See Am. Commercial Lines, 759 F.3d at 425, 2014 AMC at 2406-07; BJ Bundle,
808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 962, 2011 AMC 2220, 2246 (E.D. La. 2011), affd sub nom. In re
Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157, 2014 AMC 2600 (5th Cir. 2014).
176. See BI Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 962, 2011 AMC at 2245 ("[T]he behavior that
would give rise to punitive damages under general maritime law-gross negligence-would
also break OPA's limit of liability. Thus, the imposition of punitive damages under general
maritime law would not circumvent OPA's limitation of liability." (citation omitted)).
177. Section 2701(3) defines a "claim" as a "request ... for compensation for damages
or removal costs." 33 U.S.C. § 2701(3) (2012). Section 2701(4) defines a "claimant" as "any
person .. . who presents a claim for compensation." Id § 2701(4). Section 2701(5) defines
"damages" as "damages specified in section 2702(b) of this title." Id § 2701(5).
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is also compensatory damages. In consequence, maritime punitive
damages are overridden under § 2751(e) and its implementing
provisions, §§ 2701(3)-(5), 2704(a), and 2704(c)(1)(a). But the
Eastern District identified gross negligence1 78 and willful misconduct1 79
as standards warranting Damages 2 punitive damages under general
maritime law. The gap between the contrasting consequences
attending gross negligence and willful misconduct in OPA's text and in
B] Bundle is unbridgeable.so
VI. CONCLUSION
Outside of or in addition to OPA's key texts, several explanations
may account for B] Bundle's non-displacement outcome. Dominant
in my view is the six-state economic, environmental, and social
convulsion that the BP blowout laid upon the region's citizens and
public agencies."' Closely correlated is the priority accorded the
burdens' remediation as practically and expeditiously as possible. The
vehicle chosen was the LLA/MDL proceeding, the elasticity of which
succeeded as brilliantly as the district court judge likely anticipated
when he preliminarily advanced it at the MDL's Inaugural Trial
178. B] Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 962, 2011 AMC at 2245.
179. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon," 21 F. Supp. 3d 657,749,2014
AMC 2113, 2245 (E.D. La. 2014).
180. Clausen v. M/VNew Carissa speaks to this proposition in its statement that:
It is unreasonable to read [OPA] as authorizing punitive damages when Congress
considered the additional 'gross negligence' standard as a means for making the
responsible party liable for all actual damages, and allowing a merely negligent
responsible party to limit its liability and, for all practical purposes, receive the
unbargained-for benefit of excess insurance from the government.
171 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1134 n.4 (D. Or. 2001).
181. The catastrophe's costs and damages included contamination of 45,000 to 68,000
square miles of the Gulf's surface waters or the linear 1100 miles of its coastline; economic
and environmental damage measured in the billions of dollars; a clean-up effort of some 3.1
million barrels of crude oil that engaged ninety federal agencies, 6000 vessels, 90,000
responders, and $14 billion in recovery costs; a five-month Gulf drilling moratorium; litigation
costs on all sides that is likely without peer in this nation's legal experience; and billions of
dollars more in oil spill damages awards, civil and criminal penalties, various multibillion-
dollar settlements and PSC common benefits awards. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
"Deepwater Horizon," MDL No. 2179, 2016 WL 6215974, at *4, 2017 AMC 1051, 1057
(E.D. La. Oct. 25, 2016). BP's financial tab, including all remaining claims for opt-outs,
commercial sectors excluded from the agreement, and residents in large swaths of Texas and
Florida, is estimated to be in the $70 billion range. See Margaret Cronin Fisk & Laurel
Brubaker Calkins, BP's $18.7 Billion Oil-Spill Deal Still Leaves Lesser Messes, BLOOMBERG
(July 2, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-03/bp-s-18-7-billion-oil-
spill-deal-still-leaves-lesser-messes.
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Conference.182 Whatever its conformance with OPA's apparent
demands and uncertainties," the vehicle underwrote the trial's
common issues and a global allocation of the liability associated with
them.1 8 4
The Fifth Circuit's predisposition towards admiralty and general
maritime law, or, as one Circuit judge put it respecting offshore rig
drilling contracts, the Circuit's "reflexive invocation of admiralty
jurisdiction" may also help explain the outcome 8  The predisposition
is hardly surprising-navigation in the Mississippi's brown waters or
the Gulf's blue waves, combined with the volume of offshore oil and
gas operations in the Louisiana/Texas Gulf, are as iconic in the region
as Louis Armstrong's trumpet and red beans and rice. Nor in this legal
and economic culture is it surprising that the Supreme Court has felt it
182. See infra Appendix I.
183. A striking illustration of these uncertainties appeared in a PSC website post
encouraging B] Bundle claimants to file their claims in the LLA prior to its cut-off date:
It is important to understand that while, in the typical situation, a pure Oil
Pollution Act (OPA) claim might not be subject to the Limitation complaint filed by
Transocean, claims under ... General Maritime Law are subject to the Transocean
proceeding. Moreover, while the typical limitation proceeding might only address
Transocean's attempt to limit its liability, it is impossible to predict the implications
of Transocean's 14(c) tender to the plaintiffs of BP and the other defendants, and the
assertions of cross-claims (including contribution, subrogation and indemnity of
OPA ... claims) by BP and others within the Limitation, to be tried together, along
with fault, gross fault, and allocation. There are complex and largely res nova
issue[s] of [first impression pertaining to] preemption, presentment, preclusion,
mandatory joinder, claim splitting, choice-of-law, statute of limitations, collateral
estoppel, and res judicata which will not be resolved by [the pertinent deadline date],
ifever.
John J. Costonis, The BP Macondo Well Blowout: A Case Study in Characterization and
Consequences in the Managerial Justice Era 24 (Feb. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssm.com/abstract-2914017 (alterations in original) (quoting Edward F. Sherman, The
BP Oil Spill Litigation and Evolving Supervision of Multidistrict Litigation Judges, 30 Miss.
C. L. REV. 237, 242 n.31 (2011)).
184. Favoring the success of this effort, Samuel Issacharoff, a PSC consultant, observed
that, from time to time:
[T]here is an issue, if you get that issue resolved you can resolve all the rest of the
cases-you could run the board in BP right now. One of the fundamental issues is
how much liability does BP [have], as opposed to TransOcean, as opposed to
Halliburton, as opposed to Cameron, and the vehicle the court is using under
admiralty law is a limitation action, . . . by which you can bring this gut-cutter issue
to the fore and get it resolved, and then hopefully the rest of the cases will fall like
dominoes.
Sam Issacharoff et al., The American Law Institute's New Principles ofAggregate Litigation,
8 J.L. EcoN. & PoL'Y 183, 199 (2011).
185. Lewis v. Glendel Drilling Co., 898 F.2d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1990).
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necessary to cut back on the Fifth Circuit's expansive view of admiralty
jurisdiction in various landmark offshore drilling controversies. 18 6
Admiralty law's standing in the Gulf region's legal culture may
also play out in another way anticipated by Professor Stephen Burbank,
an early critic of the aggressive management of mass litigation.' He
predicted "that if judges are to choose among policies extrinsic to the
process of litigation, 'they will choose to advance those policies that
are their special province and to subordinate those that are not.' 18 8
Admiralty law, of course, is that special province in the BP blowout
locale.
The admiralty platform becomes more potent in consequence of
the flexibility and direct engagement afforded MDL judges in this era
of "managerial justice."l8 9 Professor Francis McGovern has identified
three advantages of managerial justice, each of which proved
influential in the MDL/LLA process.' First is the observation that
"[a]ny procedure-regardless of the nature of the underlying dispute or
the method by which procedures are applied-will affect the
outcome." 9' This observation illustrated by the efficacy of the LLA
concursus procedure as integrated with the pertinent Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. It also reveals the district court's restrained view of
OPA's displacement of admiralty and maritime procedural law, which
186. See John Costonis, And Not a Drop to Drink: Admiralty Law and the BP Well
Blowout, 73 LA. L. REV. 1, 9 n.42 (2012). During the 1953 hearings on OCSLA's adoption,
a witness testified that "maritime law in the strict sense has never had to deal with the resources
in the ground beneath the seas, and its whole tenor is ill-adopted for that purpose." Outer
Continental Shelf Hearing on S. 1901 Before the S Comm. on Interior andInsular Affairs, 83d
Cong. 668 (1953) (statement of Richard Young, Esq.). Principal among these landmark cases
are Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 1969 AMC 1082 (1969), which
held OCSLA governed accidents occurring on OCS drilling platforms, and Herb's Welding v.
Gray, 470 U.S. 414,421, 1985 AMC 1700,1705 (1985), in which the Court declared the Fifth
Circuit's view that offshore drilling is maritime commerce "untenable."
187. See Steven B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015
(1982).
188. Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits ofJudicial
Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy ofMass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39
AluZ. L. REV. 461, 479 (1997) (quoting Burbank, supra note 187, at 1191-92).
189. Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex
Litigation, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 440,441 (1986) [hereinafter McGovern, Functional Approach];
see, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1821
(1995); Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659
(1989).
190. For a further examination of the district court's deployment of these variables in
its management of the LLA/MDL trial, see Costonis, supra note 183, at 18-30.
191. McGovern, Functional Approach, supra note 189, at 450.
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the court modified only in requiring that maritime claims satisfy OPA's
presentment.
Decision makers seeking negotiated settlements, McGovern also
advises, "can estimate the probability that nontraditional litigation
management will bring about a more satisfactory outcome" by
examining and, if need be, tweaking "the appropriate parties, the
potential issues for discussion, and the information sufficient to
determine a resolution."l9 2 "Each of these variables," he adds, "is
manipulable and can be organized or reorganized to enhance settlement
potential."1 93 The most graphic illustration of this advantage appears
in the district court's denial of BP's effort to have the PSC's maritime
damages claim dismissed on displacement grounds and its subsequent
denial of BP's request to bring an interlocutory challenge to this
ruling.194 Doing so enabled the PSC, the other defendants, and the
federal government to forcefully target BP.'" It also created an
incentive for BP and the partial fault defendants to settle rather than to
risk the payment of extensive punitive damages to over 110,000 private
plaintiffs and, for BP as the OPA responsible party subject to CWA civil
penalties premised on gross negligence or willful misconduct, the
addition of potentially billions more.
McGovern's third observation contends that, unlike the
conventional judge, who functions as an umpire for contending
counsel, "the [managerial] judge can be the most important player on
192. Id. at 454.
193. Id.
194. See Status Conference at 2-3, B] Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 2011 AMC 2220
(E.D. La. 2011) (MDL No. 2179). Such pretrial rulings present the unsuccessful litigant with
the choice of either waiting the matter out until final judgment for an appeal, which it may lose
years later, or of moving quickly to settlement negotiations to minimize the financial risk posed
by the ruling, which for BP could have run perhaps thirty-five billion dollars in aggregate
liability in settlement costs to PSC claimants and increased CWA civil penalties to the federal
government. Both sets of claims were premised on a showing that BP's oil blowout conduct
met the gross negligence or willful conduct standard applicable to both sets of norms. See
Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in
Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1643, 1646 (2011) (discussing the Hobson's
choice faced by litigants in consolidated cases).
195. Fear of the PSC punitive damages demand unsettled the non-responsible party
defendants as well. Halliburton blinked, for example, agreeing to a billion-dollar range
settlement with the PSC only four days before Judge Barbier issued his ruling in the trial's first
phase releasing Halliburton from punitive damages liability as having engaged in Damages 1
activity (ordinary negligence) only. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon,"
21 F. Supp. 3d 657, 749, 2014 AMC 2113, 2245 (E.D. La. 2014); HESI Punitive Damages &
Assigned Claims Settlement Agreement (Amended as of September 2, 2015) at 44-45, B]
Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 2011 AMC 2220 (MDL No. 2179).
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the field.1 96 In his management of the MDL/LLA trial Judge Barbier
met the most demanding expectations for informed and active MDL
leadership, commencing down this path at the MDL's first trial
conference five months after the well blowout and eleven months
before the B] Bundle decision. 19
As the managerial justice movement has matured, it is not
unreasonable to ask whether the goal of expeditious settlement
embraced by the Manual on Complex Litigation has not unsettled
former modes and conceptions ofjudicial decision making in ways that
bear on principle no less than on pragmatism. It would be naive not to
anticipate that a good deal of bending of the rules-substantive and
procedural-is an inevitable consequence of contemporary case
management. But are the assumed jurisprudential and process
guardrails against the threat of the rules' outright fracture now
themselves threatened by the undoubted fruits of expeditious
settlement? May managerial efforts to alleviate the effects of large-
scale loss render judicial efforts "too big to fail" whatever the law,
considered independently of the event's social or economic disruption,
might otherwise seem to demand?
Perhaps so, particularly if judges reinstitute these guardrails for
events of lesser magnitude, as I believe the Fifth Circuit's post-B1
Bundle rulings examined in this Article demonstrate. Withholding
precedential status for federal district court decisions responsive to
settlement priorities may serve to rationalize a trade-off in which the
same foundational legal principle supports divergent outcomes
depending upon the scope of a litigated event's economic and social
disruption.
196. Issacharoffet al., supra note 184, at 194.
197. See 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 2011 AMC 2220; infra Appendix I.
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APPENDIX I: EXCERPT FROM BP MDL
INAUGURAL TRIAL CONFERENCE
A central component of the BP MDL/LLA is the concursus
process. Conventionally, a concursus rules on the limitation
petitioner's entitlement to or denial of the defense available under the
Limitation of Liability Act.'9 8 A limitation denial could result in
punitive damages for concursus claimants, but the Transocean
concursus engaged the more sweeping goal of allocating fault and
liability globally among the oil spill's principal defendants.199
The excerpt below from the MDL's Inaugural Trial Conference
derives from an exchange among the district court judge and lead
counsel for the B] Bundle claimholders and Transocean concerning
how the MDL/LLA trial should be structured, including, in particular,
whether the many actions aggregated in the MDL should be returned
to their courts of origination following the court's pretrial ruling on the
petitioner's Limitation of Liability Act defense. The court's choice to
proceed to a global allocation of liability should the limitation defense
be denied set the stage for the subsequent litigation process consistent
with that described by Samuel Issacharoff.2 00
THE COURT: .... [W]hat we have here, we have obviously the
maritime limitation, casualty, Jones Act, personal injury, maritime death
cases and those, and then we have all the economic, various types of
economic damage claims, starting with the fishermen, suppliers, dealers,
restaurants, hotels, condo owners, property owners, states, so forth,
parishes.
Mr. ROY: ....
... [I]f you, after the [deadline for filing claims-in-limitation], have
your limitation trial and rule that limitation is not available as a defense
because of privity of knowledge and so forth, then as to all claimants,
there is no limitation defense. People can proceed with their individual
trials.
THE COURT: You're not suggesting that there would be multiple
liability trials?
Mr. ROY: I'm suggesting that that may be an issue, Your Honor,
that we need to address....
198. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 7, § 13-6.
199. See supra notes 183 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 184.
552 [Vol. 93:511
THE BP MDL AND ITS AFTERMA TH
THE COURT: That's not what I envision. Because I envision that
that was the whole idea of holding the trial would be to not only deal with
limitation, but it's connected, you know, [inextricably] with-with
liability issues and allocation of fault between the parties. And the way
[Transocean's counsel] explained, he's going to 14(c) in the other
allegedly responsible parties and we'd decide that once and for all.
Is that what you envision, Mr. Miller?
MR. MILLER: That's what I understand, Your Honor. Yes. It's a
14(c) tender and that trial would involve that, allocation of fault
determination.20 1
201. See Transcript of Status Conference Proceeding Heard Before the Honorable Carl
J. Barbier United States District Judge at 39-45, B] Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 2011 AMC
2220 (MDL No. 2179) [hereinafter Transcript].
2019] 553
TULANE LA WREVIEW
APPENDIX II: ISMATCHING BASKETS AND CLAIMS
A. The Colloquy
The mismatch of claims referred to in this Article commenced in
a colloquy at the MDL's Inaugural Trial Conference among Judge
Barbier, the plaintiffs co-liaison counsel, Mr. Roy, and the BP Counsel,
Mr. Langan, intended to decide which claims would be relegated to
which baskets. The subject of the excerpt immediately below is the
content of a "pure OPA claim." Prior to the excerpt, Judge Barbier had
confirmed the invalidity in maritime law of claims that fail to satisfy
the Robins Dry Dock doctrine and commented that the "new animal
called OPA. . . appears to be intended to broaden the scope ofwho can
bring claims for purely economic damages."2 02
THE COURT: ....
... [Mlaybe the rub here or the dispute is, does [OPA's broadening
of the scope of who can bring claims for purely economic damage]
displace maritime law or not? Is that what you are alluding to?
MR. ROY That's exactly it. . . . I suspect very strongly that [BP's]
position is if it's an economic damage, OPA preempts it.
THE COURT [TO BP]: [Mr. Roy] stated your argument well,
right?
MR. LANGAN: It's displaced. I would use the term displace
rather than preempt.
MR. ROY: ....
We would suggest that at worst [OPA] establishes the possibility of
a parallel administrative requirement but that at the end of the day, once
you get into court, at worst you still have never forfeited your maritime
law rights ....
That being said, there are people that, under any construction of the
law ... would not have a Robins Dry Dock type case that would have a
pure economic loss.
THE COURT: Hotels, people like that.
MR. ROY: A wholesale processor, for example.
There is no way under General Maritime Law they would have had
a claim because of Robin Dry Dock and whatnot. And that [for] these
OPA-type cases,... it would be appropriate to have some of them set for
trial [as bellwether cases] ....
202. Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
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THE COURT: ....
I think what Mr. Roy suggested is that perhaps it would be feasible
to try a couple of what he reluctantly called pure economic, pure OPA
claims as opposed to maritime claims.203
B. The Unchallenged Assumption
Commencing with Judge Barbier's initial comment respecting
§ 2702(b)(2)(E)'s broadening of the scope of who can bring claims for
purely economic damages, what is notable in this colloquy is the lack
of coverage given to § 2702(b)(2)(B)'s coverage of the former
maritime law Robins-qualified claims, even though this provision
should have been the focus of the discussion. If OPA had lacked
§ 2702(b)(2)(B), the PSC and Judge Barbier's exclusion of Robins-
qualified claims from the OPA basket would be unobjectionable
because § 2702(b)(2)(E) does not speak to these claims. Yet the
discussion proceeds as if the only OPA damages provision of
consequence is § 2702(b)(2)(E), as evidenced by the identification of
OPA claims as pure economic claims, and the speakers' opposition of
this OPA category to maritime claims, which they equate with maritime
law, Robins-qualified claims.
C. Populating the MDL/LLA Concursus and Trial with
Overlapping § 2 702(b) (2) (B) and 2 702(b) (2) (E) Claims
The district court established a procedure by which claimants
could file "Short-Form Joinders," which would simultaneously assert
a claim in the limitation action as well as a joinder in the B 1 Master
Complaint.20 Complaints were filed on behalf of private plaintiffs
asserting economic injuries arising from the "Short-Form Joinders,"
which allowed the concurrent assertion in the LLA of claims asserted
in the MDL action.20 5 As noted in the preceding footnote, claimants
203. Id. at 40-48 (emphasis added).
204. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon," MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La.
Jan. 12,2011) (pretrial order no. 24); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon," MDL
No. 2179 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2011) (pretrial order no. 25).
205. Some 133,000 claims by 101,000 claimants were filed under this procedure. See
In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon," MDL No. 2179, 2016 WL 6215974, at
*4, 2017 AMC 1051, 1057 (E.D. La. Oct. 25, 2016). The claimants included individuals that
suffered environmental and economic damages, some indeterminate number of whom qualify
as Robins-qualified claimants. The appellants' brief described the nature of the claims and
claimants filing under this procedure:
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and claimants-in-limitation included businesses that suffered
environmental and economic damages.20 6 As such, these businesses
and individuals would appear to hold some combination of Robins-
unqualified claims (i.e., true pure economic claims, under
§ 2702(b)(2)(E), and Robins-qualified claims under § 2702(b)(2)(B)),
which duplicate the pre-OPA maritime claims according to the court.2 07
Under the District Court's guidance, and with the agreement of all parties,
subsequent pre-trial orders allowed "Bl" ... Plaintiffs to join into both the
Transocean Limitation Action as Claimants and to simultaneously assert claims
against BP and the other defendants-who had been brought into the Limitation
Action by Transocean pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(c)-by joining
consolidated BI and B3 Master Answers-in-Limitation, Claims-in-Limitation, and
Complaints, via "Short Form Joinder" filings ....
.... Therefore, the existing Appellant Plaintiffs and Claimants-in-Limitation
are businesses, individuals, and government entities that suffered environmental and
economic damages as a result of the three-month-long Oil Spill, and not simply the
explosions andfire that occurred on April 20, 2010.
Plaintiffs/Appellants Original Brief on the Merits at 5-7, In re Deepwater Horizon, No. 14-
31374 (5th Cir. June 1, 2015) (emphasis added).
206. Id. at 6-7.
207. Transcript, supra note 201, at 7, 34-35, 39, 44.
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